





Pellew Associates

Evaluation of Retail Security Grants (Project 706)



November 2006

Tom Wildy
Pellew Associates
9 Pellew Place
PLYMOUTH
PL2 1EQ
T: 01752 556008
M: 07970 423802
E: tom.wildy@btinternet.com



Contents

- Contents i
- 1. Executive Summary..... 1
- 2. Summary of Recommendations..... 1
- 3. Original Purpose of Project..... 2
- 4. Fit with DRC Partnership Objectives..... 2
- 5. Summary of activity to date 3
- 6. Stakeholders..... 3
 - (a) DRC Partnership 3
 - (b) Local businesses 3
 - (c) Local Residents 4
 - (d) The Police..... 4
 - (e) Shoppers 5
 - (f) Visitors 5
- 7. Local context 5
- 8. Policy fit 5
 - (a) Local..... 5
 - (b) Regional 5
 - (c) National 5
- 9. Project progression..... 5
- 10. Outputs and monitoring..... 6
- 11. Involvement of minority groups 6
- 12. Sustainability and mainstreaming..... 6
- 13. Implementation arrangements..... 7
- 14. Publicity and promotion 7
- 15. Applicant's views..... 7
- 16. Residents' views 8
- 17. Security Consultant's Views..... 8
- 18. Value for money 9
- 19. Impact on Crime..... 9
- 20. Conclusions and the recommendations 10
- Appendix 1 - Retail Crime Offences..... 12
- Business Sectors 12



1. Executive Summary

Pellew Associates were asked to carry out an evaluation of the Retail Security Grants Project (No. 706)

The Retail Security Grants Project is designed to support retail security premises in the DRC Partnership area of benefit.

Its objective is to reduce crime, support the development of business, and contribute to the perceived security of the area.

Since its start some 48 businesses have used the project to ensure the security of their premises. Most project clients are happy with the way the project operates, and there is evidence to suggest that some businesses would not be viable without it.

The Police, a major stakeholder in the project, view it as a success. Their only criticism was that many of the businesses to whom they had recommended the project had already been the victims of retail crime. It was important that more took advantage of the project early, and to that end better publicity was needed.

While there is no doubt that the project contributed to the security of successful applicants, concern has been expressed about the quality of some installations.

Since the start of the project retail burglary figures have fallen year on year. This indicates a positive trend which is supported by the change in people very or fairly concerned about burglary, which has fallen by 11% between 2002 and 2006.¹

The project may therefore be viewed as a success. However, evidence suggests that it was too late for some retail premises, being recommended to them by the Police after burglary or vandalism.

It is unclear to what extent the project displaces retail crime to unprotected premises within the area or neighbouring areas. An analysis of retail crime since before the project commenced would assist in determining the extent of displacement (if any) and would inform the project's future development.



In our recommendations we set out ways in which the project might operate more effectively within a framework of wider support for business setup and development. Broadly the recommendations favour a more 'joined up' approach, better advertising, early engagement of retail businesses, and working towards mainstreaming the project.

2. Summary of Recommendations

We give below a summary of our recommendations:

- 1 **Redesign of the quarterly project update forms should be considered to ensure clarity and accuracy**
- 2 **The tracking process should be reviewed with a view to ensuring clarity and thoroughness**
- 3 **Businesses run by minority groups of all sorts should be targeted to support their development and minimise targeting by criminals and others**

¹ Ipsos MORI Household Survey 2002, 2004, 2006



DRC Partnership should explore the possibilities of mainstreaming the project by merging it with business advice and other services to form a comprehensive business development and support service

- 5 Promotion and publicity should be reviewed with the objective of improving project take-up and publicity for its achievements
- 6 The project should be featured on the DRC Partnership website, perhaps with an online interactive application form
- 7 See Applicant's views, page 7: Comments 1 – 6 above be noted, and the suggestion in comment 7 be considered for the further development of the project
- 8 The Project should be continued
- 9 A detailed analysis of the pattern of retail crime offences ad commercial and community and social enterprises should be considered to determine the extent to which crime is displaced, and to help shape the future of the project
- 10 Consideration should be given to extending the scheme to cover social enterprises and other activities falling outside the current criteria

3. Original Purpose of Project

The Project was established to offer assistance to retailers for identified security measures to their premises. This originally complemented a Home Office funded scheme applicable to premises in the former St Peters Ward.

The grants fund enhanced security such as CCTV, alarms, security lighting, improved locks, toughened glass and other measures as necessary.

Each location is assessed by a Retail Security Consultant, who makes recommendations for improved security.



4. Fit with DRC Partnership Objectives

The Project fits with the original Key Objectives and Supporting Outcomes as follows:

- KO5 To reduce the incidence of crime to a level below the Plymouth average
- KO8 To increase to 90% the proportion of residents who feel they have an opportunity to influence decisions being made in the area
- SO6 To increase the level of business Floor Space by 25%

It also fits with the new Strategic Aims and Targets as follows:

- CS1 Increase community confidence and reduce fear of crime
- CS2 Reduce overall levels of crime
- EM6 Maximise local employment opportunities
- EM7 Create a safe, vibrant, supportive and attractive business environment
- EM10 Make Devonport attractive as a business location and sell it
- EM12 Support key sectors through targeted assistance
- EM13 Promote the sustainable future of the business community by raising awareness of local development opportunities, targeting inward investment and publicising change
- EM7 Create a safe, vibrant, supportive and attractive business environment
- EM8 Create the right conditions for business survival and growth



Summary of activity to date

Since the project start in 2003/2004 57 businesses applied for and 48 benefited from improved security. This represents about half the businesses in the NDC area. All business in the area were surveyed, but not all have applied. Of those that applied 48 were successful. Project expenditure at to the end of Quarter 4 2006/7 was £195,092 capital and £25,916 revenue. Non-eligible businesses are told at the initial enquiry stage and so never come to the full application stage. Records show that two were not accepted one because it was part of a national chain, while the other was located outside the area of benefit. However this accounts only for two of nine failed applications.

Equipment installed usually comprises high definition Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) recording to computer hard drive with intruder alarms and some security fixings. The CCTV system is very easy to use, and footage required for enquiries or evidence and can easily be copied to a CD, making it quickly accessible to the police.

Businesses seldom apply for the full possible grant of £9,000, the average being about £5,000. It is possible for successful applicants to use the balance for upgrades and extensions. To date five have done so, though three are premises that have changed hands since the first grant, and the new owners felt that an upgrade was needed.

6. Stakeholders

Identified stakeholders include the DRC Partnership, local businesses, local residents, the police, shoppers and visitors to the area.

The impact of the project on stakeholders varies according to their relationship:

(a) DRC Partnership


From the DRC Partnership's perspective the project works because it engages with local businesses, thus demonstrating one facet of the NDC's impact on the area, and contributes to a better local understanding of what it does. Tying in as it does with the local police and the Bobbies on the Beat (Project 701), project 706 supports the economic development of the area by supporting new and existing businesses. This in turn encourages businesses moving to the area, thus providing more job opportunities and access to goods and services for residents.

(b) Local businesses

For local businesses the project helps provide a safer environment by discouraging crime, and making it easier to catch perpetrators. However, there may be an element of displacement of criminal activity as potential perpetrators move to 'safer' areas. Recent research suggests that the displacement effect may be far less than previously thought,² (see Appendix 3 - Crime Displacement on page 17 for the full text) and is in any case hard to quantify, but must be borne in mind in any such project.

A positive example is a local hairdresser. The owner of this business told us that she could not have opened without the additional security provided by the grant. This is a good example of the impact of the project.

² Town, Stephen 'Displacement: The perception, problems, evidence and supporting theory', 2001 CrimeReductionUK (<http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/skills/skills10.htm>)



Interestingly not all businesses apply for the full grant (£9,000), the average being about £5,000. However, it is possible for those that have not claimed the full amount to use the balance for equipment upgrades and improvements.

(c) Local Residents

Local residents have been aware for years that the local crime rate has been well above the City average. This has supported the development of a culture that assumes a high rate of crime, and this, with the reluctance to give information to the police, has contributed to the poor image of the area held by many residents. The proportion of people very or fairly worried about burglary has fallen by 11% since 2002³, while the rate of 'Burglary Other' (Non-domestic burglary) has fallen from 8.7 to 6.8 incidents per 1,000 population between 2003/4 and 2005/6. Though this does not include the crimes most associated with theft from commercial premises⁴, it is indicative of the change in public perception, and it can be argued that an improvement in such perception is in part affected by such projects. The above indicates that this project, with others like it, has helped reduce incidence of crime in the area, and to change perceptions and build confidence amongst local people.

While there is no clear evidence of a large number of jobs being created for local people as a direct consequence of the project, it is highly probable that a number of jobs have been created as new business opens, and that, at the very least, people who would have had to work outside the area can now work close to home.

The hairdresser mentioned above employs three people, including two trainees, all local people who would otherwise have had to work outside the area, assuming they were employed at all.

Comment [TW1]: Check this with Janine

Some local residents do not like the blank look that security shutters give the street, but broadly support the project.

(d) The Police

In addition to the standard Neighbourhood Beat Team a further eight constables and one sergeant are funded by the DRC Partnership through Project 701 (Bobbies on the Beat). Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) are now gradually replacing the Constables on the Bobbies on the Beat team.

The police regard the project as useful and positive incentive for business to move into the area. The project is a valuable deterrent, and is now linking up with the City-wide Plymouth Against Retail Crime (PARC) scheme, which equips members with the StoreNet radio system.

Application to the project for funds is straightforward, and the police estimate that at least 25% of applications have been made through a police referral, often after a crime has been committed.

Notwithstanding the comments on the impact of crime below, the police feel that it is hard to link the project with a fall in crime. Theft manifests itself as shoplifting and theft from staff-rooms in retail premises. However the police are confident that the scheme acts as a deterrent. An unintended positive aspect is the use of high-quality video equipment in retail premises which looks out on to the street. This has proved useful in helping solve some street crime. This means that in addition to the positive outcome for local

³ Ipsos MORI Household Surveys 2002, 2004, 2006
⁴ See Appendix 1 - Retail Crime Offences, page 12



businesses there is a wider benefit for residents beyond that of having access to local retail and service outlets.

The project needs to be 'sold' to retailers more vigorously. The advent of the PCSOs and the PARC scheme provide an opportunity to raise the scheme's profile in the area.

Overall the police view the project as useful and a positive contribution to the reduction of crime in the area.

(e) Shoppers

The project supports shoppers by ensuring a wider range of retail opportunities are available and by helping to reduce crime in and around the local shopping centre. The positive impact of a safe shopping area with a wider range of shops and products available will support the economic and social development of the area.

(f) Visitors

The attractiveness of an area may be measured by the number of visitors coming in for a variety of reasons. The importance of visitors is a measure of the level of welcome an area provides.

7. Local context

Non-domestic burglary crime rate is well above the City average. Local businesses suffered from this, and Devonport's reputation discourages potential business or visitors shopping. The project seeks to address the underlying issues of the security of business premises, and reduce the level of incidents.

8. Policy fit

Local

The project fits with the Key Objectives, Supporting Outcomes and Strategic Aims and Targets as set out above. (See Fit with DRC Partnership Objectives, page 2) It also fits with the Plymouth against Retail Crime (PARC) project, which has been recently extended into Devonport.

(a) Regional


There are no specific Regional Crime Policies that relate to this project.

(b) National

The project supports national crime reduction measures as set out in the National Floor Targets. (Reducing the overall crime rate by 15%). The DTI funds retail security grants for some cities through the appropriate Regional Development Agency. Those receiving such funding are in the North West.

9. Project progression

To date 48 businesses have benefited from the project. In particular some businesses have been empowered to open, as without the grant they could not have afforded security measures. One example of this is a hairdresser, who has stated that she could not have started her business without the support of the Retail Security Grant. The business is doing well, and employs three people. This links back to the wider purpose of the DRC Partnership in supporting retail development and encouraging the growth of businesses as



part of the economic development of the area through job creation and new business start-ups.

However, despite a survey of all businesses, only 57 have applied of which 48 were successful. This would indicate that either businesses are not aware of the service, or do not feel it appropriate, perhaps because they do not perceive a risk.

10. Outputs and monitoring

The project is administered by the DRC Partnership. Regular monitoring and reporting has been carried out on a quarterly basis to the Project Link Officer. These reports have formed the basis of requests for project extensions. However, the way the reports are set out does not make it clear what outputs have been achieved. As a consequence it is not clear how thorough tracking of the report has been.

Recommendation 1 **Redesign of the quarterly project update forms should be considered to ensure clarity and accuracy**

Recommendation 2 **The tracking process should be reviewed with a view to ensuring clarity and thoroughness**

11. Involvement of minority groups

There is no explicit indication of engagement/involvement of minority groups as traders or clients of local business. However it may be assumed that any benefit to businesses or their customers would benefit members of minority groups. This may have an adverse effect on businesses run by members of the BME population.

Recent research⁵ shows that many racist incidents in Plymouth occur at shops or fast food outlets operated by BME staff. There is evidence that such incidents are under-reported, and security measures such as CCTV would be of use in reducing them and deterring or catching the perpetrators.

If such businesses were to apply for funding CCTV could be used as outlined above, and public areas could be made more secure, thus inhibiting potential racist incidents or catching their authors, emphasising the unacceptability of such behaviour and actions and attracting engagement from a business sector known for its enterprise and hard work.


Recommendation 3 **Businesses run by minority groups of all sorts should be targeted to support their development and minimise targeting by criminals and others**

12. Sustainability and mainstreaming

Little work has yet been done on ensuring the long-term sustainability and mainstreaming of the project. It should perhaps be considered as part of a wider business support service, tying in with business advice, start-up grants, energy advice and similar initiatives.

The proposed successor body to the DRC Partnership has not yet indicated the grant will be maintained after the end of the Partnership. However, all new build commercial and retail premises will be constructed with a far higher standard of security than existing property as standard.

⁵ **Select Committee Community Cohesion and Equalities Overview and Scrutiny Panel**
September 2004



cent proposals to submit a bid for a Business Improvement District (BID) could unlock funds to upgrade retail security in existing premises and in the retail area as a whole.

Searches show that there is little in the way of specific alternative funding to support specific businesses in improving and maintaining their commercial security. Schemes such as that funded by the DTI and run by Salford City Council⁶ which offers grants and loans up to £25,000 through the North West Development Agency. There is no equivalent scheme run by the South West RDA. Some possible grant funding streams are shown in Appendix 2 - Possible Alternative Funding Streams, page 14, but there appears to be no specific funding in the South West R

Recommendation 4 DRC Partnership should explore the possibilities of mainstreaming the project by merging it with business advice and other services to form a comprehensive business development and support service

13. Implementation arrangements

A DRC Partnership Project Link Officer (PLO) manages the application process and supports and advises applicants. Applications are made by direct contact or through a referral from the Bobbies on the Beat project or the police. Once an application form has been submitted the PLO arranges for a Retail Security Consultant to survey the premises and makes recommendations to the PLO, who then forward the application and recommendations to the applicant. The objective is to get quotes for work informed by the Consultant's recommendations. It is the applicant's responsibility to commission the work. Once complete receipts and other documentation is passed to the PLO who authorises the payment against valid documents.

All recipients were satisfied with the work carried out. Some interviewees commented that they would welcome advice and support on a range of business topics, and not just security. (See Recommendation 4 page 7)

14. Publicity and promotion

In the early days promotion and publicity were inconsistent, thought this was rectified later. Current publicity and promotion is not as strong as it might be, particularly in terms of celebrating the successes of the project.

Recommendation 5 Promotion and publicity should be reviewed with the objective of improving project take-up and publicity for its achievements

Recommendation 6 The project should be featured on the DRC Partnership website, perhaps with an online interactive application form


15. Applicant's views

A Focus Group was held to which all 48 successful applicants were invited and eight attended (16%). Key points that emerged are:

All recipients expressed satisfaction with the opportunity to apply for the grants, and in particular with the help, advice and support provided by DRC Partnership.

1. The application process and paperwork was straightforward, and the help from DRC Partnership during the process was praised

⁶ Salford City Council <http://www.salford.gov.uk/business/bas/basgrants.htm>



were happy with the recommendations of the security consultant with the single exception of a company operating from a listed building. It was felt that this was not fully taken into account, and prevented the full implementation of the advice.

2. Some businesses applied for further grants as they expanded
3. One business commented that 'without security grant my business would never have got off the ground'.
4. Many businesses had been advised of the project by the police following a burglary or vandalism. Some recipients expressed concern at this

It was suggested that

- a. Publicity for the grants could be improved
- b. A security survey should form part of any application for any DRC Partnership funding (where appropriate)
- c. The project could form part of a menu of business-related support services, including advice and support. This might take the form of material included in the application pack

Recommendation 7 **Comments 1 – 6 above be noted, and the suggestion in comment 7 be considered for the further development of the project**

16. Residents' views

Some residents felt that the security shutters gave a poor impression of the area. However most thought the project was a worthwhile useful way of supporting local business.

17. Security Consultant's Views


The independent Security Consultant used by the project has 15 years experience as a servicing police officer working in the field of home and business security. Since retiring he has developed his career as a successful and respected security consultant.

The DRC Project Link Officer (PLO) manages the application process and supports and advises applicants. Applications are made by direct contact or through a referral from the Bobbies on the Beat project or the police. Once an application form has been submitted the PLO arranges for a Retail Security Consultant to survey the premises and makes recommendations to the PLO, who then forward the application and recommendations to the applicant. The objective is to get quotes for work informed by the Consultant's recommendations. It is the applicant's responsibility to commission the work. Once complete receipts and other documentation is passed to the PLO who authorises the payment against valid documents. The PLO asks the Consultant to visit each premise where there is an installation to inspect the work.

This means that the fitness for purpose of an applicant's installation depends on the contractor used. Different contractors work to different levels of specification, and installations vary accordingly. Some are of very high quality, while others are carried out in such a way that the security devices installed may be easily defeated.

The Security Consultant's comments on the process raised the following points:

1. Did the application form take full account of applicant's possible literacy levels?
2. Is the whole process more laborious than it need be?



- 3. Are local traders sufficiently aware of the Project?
- 4. Does the project take account of wider security issues, such as staff safety?
- 5. Would it be more useful to specify a higher level of installation?

Usually the installation work is done by a contractor known to the DRC who will deal with any subsequent problems.

Comment [TW2]: Contradicti on here - speak John Chatwin

These last two points are of considerable importance: if premises are secure from theft does it follow that staff are safer from attack? Is the quality of the installation such that pictures from cameras are of sufficient quality to provide evidence, and the installation good enough to defeat skilled burglars?

These questions are central to the success of the project in making Devonport a safer place to do business, and to deter and catch criminals targeting retail business.

We would argue that as far as possible security installations should share a high quality of installation and functionality that staff safety should feature as an element of the project and that the quality assurance aspect to the project should be improved.

The most obvious means of ensuring a good standard of equipment and installation post-installation inspection carried out by the Security Consultant at the PLO's request.

Recommendation 8 As to raising awareness of retailers, there should be an increase in publicity through the media, in presentations organised as part of the multi-theme days, and for retailer's organisations. (See Recommendation 5, page 7).

18. Value for money

The total cost of the programme to date is £221,008. If each of the 48 premises with improved security had been broken into it is estimated that it would have cost a minimum of £120,000⁷ (2000 values) in addition to the loss and distress suffered by the businesses and the further damage to the reputation of the area.

We therefore consider the project is good value for money because of the avoidance of cost to the public purse, distress and disruption to business in the area, and the further damage to reputation of Devonport.



19. Impact on Crime

As noted above, an unintended consequence of projects that delivery enhanced security is the displacement of criminal activity to areas where it is easier to carry out undetected. It is very difficult to identify the extent to which this might have occurred with Project 706. The crimes most associated with retail burglary and theft are Burglary Other, and Theft.

In the period 2003-2006 the number of incidents per thousand populations for these two types has changed as set out below:

Incidents per 1,000 population	2003/4	2004/5	2006/7
Burglary Other	8.7	7.1	6.8

⁷ Brand S and Price R – Home Office Research Study 217: The Social and Economic Costs of Crime, Home Office, October 2000



Comment [TV] Set acti figures

theft	27.2	41.5	34.4
-------	------	------	------

Theft relates to all non-violent theft, so is less specific to retail crime. However, Burglary Other has fallen by 1.9 incidents per 1,000 population, about 10 actual offences.

This would tend to indicate a downward trend in the number of non-domestic burglaries over the time that the project has been in operation.

It is therefore possible to conclude that the project has had a positive impact on retail burglary in the NDC area. It is not possible to conclude that it has had an impact on theft without obtaining disaggregated figures from the police showing what crimes where committed where.

20. Conclusions and the recommendations

We conclude that the project has been successful, and is good value for money. Recipients are happy with the process and the additional security provided for their premises. We recommend that the project continue as it has a vital role to play in the development of successful and secure businesses in the DRC Partnership area of benefit, thus supporting DRC Partnership policy on economic regeneration.

Recommendation 9 The Project should be continued

Publicity and promotion of the project has been somewhat inconsistent in the past, and is somewhat lacking at present. It needs to be developed so as to support take-up of the grants, and to ensure that the public, and particularly Devonport residents, are made fully aware of the success of the project and of the DRC Partnership. To quote the Employment Theme Strategic Aim 'To make Devonport a good place to do business and to sell it'. (See Recommendation 5 Promotion and publicity should be reviewed with the objective of improving project take-up and publicity for its achievements page 7).


In order to support and further publicise the project it should be given a clear virtual presence on the DRC Partnership website. (See Recommendation 6 The project should be featured on the DRC Partnership website, perhaps with an online interactive application , page 7).

This issue of the quality of installations funded by DRC Partnership is central to the success of the project. A poor installation or sub-standard equipment had a negative impact, as the assumption that a premise is being protected when in fact the equipment installed in not effective leads to complacency which may provide an opportunity for crime. As noted above there is at present no quality check on installations, and this should be considered.

The project is aimed at retail premises. The criteria exclude chains or other business from outside the area with branches in Devonport. It also excludes other premises which may be vulnerable in other ways: Community facilities, community business and similar enterprises.

The received wisdom is that good security systems will tend to displace crime (though research contradicts this position)⁸, and the 'professional' criminals specialising in retail crime may simply cast about to find 'softer' targets. It is not clear what impact the project

⁸ Town, Stephen 'Displacement: The perception, problems, evidence and supporting theory' 2001 CrimeReductionUK (<http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/skills/skills10.htm>)





s had on unprotected premises (in particular those that are excluded) in the way of an increase in offences targeted against them, and an analysis of the pattern of offences against premises in the area to see if there is evidence of displacement and to what extent it takes place. This work could then be used to determine whether the extension of the project to such premises might be a positive move.

Recommendation 10 A detailed analysis of the pattern of retail crime offences ad commercial and community and social enterprises should be considered to determine the extent to which crime is displaced, and to help shape the future of the project

Recommendation 11 Consideration should be given to extending the scheme to cover social enterprises and other activities falling outside the current criteria

DRC Partnership has as yet done no work on the sustainability and mainstreaming of the project. We believe that its promotion and continuation would be best done as part of a wider business start-up, development and support package. This would enable a wider spread of publicity, provide a joined up approach to crime and community safety, employment and economic development. It should include social enterprise, and move from meeting perceived need in terms of *ad hoc* retro fitting of security measures to a proactive programme working with developing business premises to help design out crime as well as upgrading existing business. It might also be passed to the DRC Partnership's successor body as part of the continuing social and economic regeneration of the area. This will help attract new business into the area, and support Devonport's economic renaissance. (See Recommendation 4 DRC Partnership should explore the possibilities of mainstreaming the project by merging it with business advice and other services to form a comprehensive business development and support service page 7).



Appendix 1 - Retail Crime Offences


Offences can include: property crimes, violent crimes and anti-social behaviour, notably:

Property Crimes	<p>Commercial Burglary Criminal damage Fraud and Forgery</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shop theft • Theft by employees • Theft of and from vehicles
Violent Crimes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assault • Harassment - including staff harassment & racially aggravated harassment • Robbery
Anti-social behaviour	<p>Criminal or nuisance behaviour causing harassment, alarm or distress to staff or customers, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Verbal abuse o Low level harassment and intimidation, including racial intimidation o Graffiti and vandalism <p>See Anti-Social Behaviour Toolkit for further discussion of definitions of anti-social behaviour.</p>



Business Sectors

The business sectors involved include:

Business sectors	Research Material
Agriculture	George Street Research (1999) <i>Crime and the farming community: The Scottish farm crime survey 1998</i> . The Scottish Office, Central Research Unit
Banks/Financial Services	<p>Austin, C (1988) <i>The Prevention of Robbery at Building Society Branches</i>, Crime Prevention Unit Paper 14, London, Home Office. Full report</p> <p>Eklblom, P (1987) <i>Preventing Robberies at Sub-Post Offices: an evaluation of a security initiative</i>, Crime Prevention Unit Paper 9, London, Home Office Full report</p> <p>Levi, M, Bissell, P & Richardson, T (1991) <i>The Prevention of Cheque and Credit Card Fraud</i>, Crime Prevention Unit Series Paper 26, London, Home Office Full report</p> <p>Levi, M & Handley, J (1998) <i>The prevention of plastic and cheque fraud revisited</i>, Home Office Research Study 182, London, Home Office</p>
Construction	Smith, A & Walmsley, R (1999) <i>The nature and extent of construction plant theft</i> Police Research Series Paper 117, London, Home Office Full report



	Summary report
Information technology	Whitehead, P & Gray, P (1998) <i>Pulling the Plug on Computer Theft</i> , Police Research Series Paper 101, London, Home Office Full report Summary report
Leisure and Tourism	Burrows, J & Ingram, D (2000) <i>Counting the cost: Crime against business in Scotland – The restaurants/takeaways and pubs/clubs subsectors</i> Crime & Criminal Justice Research Finding No. 38, Scottish Executive Morris, S (1998) <i>Clubs, Drugs and Doormen</i> , Crime Detection & Prevention Series Paper 86, London, Home Office Full report (NB 1.6Mb) Summary report
Manufacturing	Brown, R (1995) <i>The Nature & Extent of Heavy Goods Vehicle Theft</i> , Crime Detection & Prevention Series Paper 66, London, Home Office Full report Summary report
Mobile Services and Repair	Brown, R & Saliba, J (1998) <i>The Nature and Extent of Light Commercial Vehicle Theft</i> , Crime Detection & Prevention Series Paper 88, London, Home Office. Full report (NB 1.7Mb)
Motor Traders	Burrows, J & Ingram, D (2000) <i>Counting the cost: Crime against business in Scotland – The motor/fuel and retail sub-sectors</i> Crime & Criminal Justice Research Finding No. 40, Scottish Executive
Retail	Burrows, J (1988) <i>Retail Crime: Prevention through crime analysis</i> Crime Prevention Unit Paper 11, London, Home Office Full report Burrows, J & Ingram, D (2000) <i>Counting the cost: Crime against business in Scotland – The motor/fuel and retail sub-sectors</i> Crime & Criminal Justice Research Finding No. 40, Scottish Executive Ekblom, P (1986) <i>The Prevention of Shop Theft: An approach through crime analysis</i> Crime Prevention Unit Paper 5, London, Home Office Full report Ekblom, P & Simon, F with Birdi, S (1988) <i>Crime Prevention and Racial Harassment in Asian-run Small Shops: The scope for prevention.</i> Crime Prevention Unit Paper 15, London, Home Office. Full report McCulloch, H (1996) <i>Shop Theft: Improving the Police Response</i> , Crime Detection & Prevention Series Paper 76, London, Home Office Full report Summary report
Storage and distribution of goods	
Transport	Burrows, J & Ingram, D (2000) <i>Counting the cost: Crime against business in Scotland – The public transport / taxis sub-sectors</i> Crime & Criminal Justice Research Finding No. 39, Scottish Executive



Activities	
------------	--

Appendix 2 - Possible Alternative Funding Streams

UGD610 TITLE: HOME OFFICE: TILLEY AWARDS

LAST UPDATE: Mar 07

GRANTfinder Release May 07

DESCRIPTION OF AID

- Type. Financial award
- Term. Unspecified
- Covering. Financial support for police forces and partner agencies across the UK to recognise and reward good practice in implementing problem oriented principles to address day to day police work.
- Support. Financial assistance towards attending the Annual International Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) Conference in the USA
- Match Fund. Not applicable

NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS OF APPLICANT

- Status. Organisation
- Type. Police forces and partner agencies
- Location. United Kingdom

CRITERIA

- Timing. Annual award scheme. The 2007 deadline for entries: 27 April 2007 (12 noon)
- Avail. Competitive
- Other. Entries can be either about reducing crime and disorder problems or about organisational aspects of partnership working. However, the focus must be on the effective delivery of a problem-oriented approach to crime reduction.

APPLICATION

- Special Form. Yes, available from the website below
- Supported By. A letter from the nominated senior representatives endorsing the entry

SPONSORED BY

Home Office

ADDRESS

6th Floor
 Peel Building (SE Quarter)
 2 Marsham Street
 London SW1P 4DF
 Tel: (020) 7035 4811
 E-mail: alex.blackwell@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk
 Website: <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk>



UGG660 TITLE: DCLG: LOCAL AREA AGREEMENTS (ENGLAND)

LAST UPDATE: Feb 07

GRANTfinder Release May 07

DESCRIPTION OF AID

- Type. Local Area Agreements
- Covering. The development and piloting of Local Area Agreements (LAAs) in participating areas of England. LAAs represent a radical new approach to build a more flexible and responsive relationship between central government and local authorities and their partners. Councils and partners in the areas will benefit from less ring fenced funding, less red tape and more flexibility in how they work.
- Support. A combination of funding streams (see DESCRIPTION OF AID in the



- Other. Detail Section of this report)
- Other. LAAs are structured around four area-based funding blocks: Safer and Stronger Communities; Children and Young People; Healthy Communities, Older People; and Economic Development and Enterprise

NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS OF APPLICANT

- Type. 89 areas are negotiating LAAs (see NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS OF APPLICANT in the Detail Section of this report)
- Location. England
- Other. The remaining 63 local authorities, and their partners, developing LAAs during 2006 will complete the full roll-out across England

CRITERIA

- Timing. The negotiation period for the third round of LAAs is expected to run until March 2007
- Other. Local authorities and Local Strategic Partnerships are expected to take forward LAAs and engage partners fully in negotiations

APPLICATION

- Special Form. -
- Supported By. -

SPONSORED BY

The Department for Communities and Local Government (which has replaced the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister)

ADDRESS

26 Whitehall
 London SW1A 2WH
 Tel: (020) 7944 4400
 Website: <http://www.communities.gov.uk>

UI8480 TITLE: SWRDA: SOUTH WEST OF ENGLAND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY - OVERVIEW

LAST UPDATE: Jan 07



GRANTfinder Release May 07

DESCRIPTION OF AID

- Type. Financial assistance/information and advice
- Term. Unspecified
- Covering. A broad overview of the objectives and priorities of the South West of England Regional Development Agency, including information on the range of services provided and the types of initiatives administered.
- Elig Exp. Varies
- Support. Varies - support may be available for projects which range from small community-based projects to large infrastructure developments
- Payment. As arranged
- Match Fund. Varying levels of match funding may be required, depending on the nature of the scheme. Cash and in-kind contributions are generally accepted. RDA programmes can generally be used to match fund other funding schemes
- Other. RDAs support a wide range of activities including property development, business growth, tourism, and community development

NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS OF APPLICANT

- Status. Individuals/organisations
- Type. RDAs provide support for a wide range of organisations, businesses, companies and individuals
- Emp'ees. Some restrictions may apply for certain schemes



- Size. Some restrictions may apply for certain schemes
- Location. South West of England
- Other. Targeted sectors are dependent upon the nature of the scheme

CRITERIA

- Timing. Varies with individual initiatives
- Viability. Projects must be viable
- Avail. Discretionary
- Other. Initiatives will operate to specific terms and conditions

APPLICATION



- Special Form. Varies
- Discussion. Varies - dependent upon nature of scheme

SPONSORED BY

South West of England Regional Development Agency

ADDRESS

Corporate Headquarters
Sterling House
Dix's Field
Exeter EX1 1QA
Tel: (01392) 214747
Fax: (01392) 214848
E-mail: enquiries@southwestrda.org.uk
Website: <http://www.southwestrda.org.uk>



Appendix 3 - Crime Displacement

Displacement: The perception, problems, evidence and supporting theory

By

Stephen Town

Bradford District Architectural Liaison Officer

This dissertation will seek to show that the issue of crime displacement is one of the most widely misunderstood aspects of crime. It will aim to explore the reasons for this situation and to assess the large quantity of available evidence. It will then argue that the evidence refutes the overwhelmingly held opinion, which has long damaged crime prevention initiatives. Finally, it will seek to explain the reasons why reality is so at odds with perception.



Contents

Page Number	
Displacement and 'Common Sense'	3
The Great Divide	4
The Suicide Analogy	5
Research on Crime Displacement	6
Residential Burglary	7
The Damage to Crime Prevention	7
Beyond the Hesseling Review	8
Why isn't Crime Displaced?	9
Opportunity Knocks	10
The Road to Nowhere	11
Conclusion	12
References	14

Displacement and 'Common Sense'

Reducing the opportunity for crime through situational crime prevention has long had its critics. Situational crime prevention aims to change the environment or setting that criminals operate within, so that crime requires more effort, more risk and produces lower rewards. This approach has been criticised because it is said to merely move (displace or deflect) crime in one of five ways – described by Felson and Clarke (1998):

- crime can be moved from one location to another (geographical displacement);
- crime can be moved from one time to another (temporal displacement);
- crime can be directed away from one target to another (target displacement);
- one method of committing crime can be substituted for another (tactical displacement);



the kind of crime can be substituted for another (crime type displacement).



If true, this would seriously undermine crime prevention initiatives. After all, what would be the point of spending considerable time, effort and money to simply move a problem? Indeed, wouldn't this make the situation even more fluid, unpredictable and difficult to manage? Dealing with crime is a core task for the police and surely within its ranks we might reasonably expect to find an informed view of the subject. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. Barr and Pease (1990) comment, *"Experience in mounting crime-prevention initiatives shows that scepticism about their worth is often and frustratingly based on the presumption of total displacement . . . Most galling is the frequency with which extreme case pessimists are to be found among police officers whose confidence about the crime reduction effects of patrolling choices has failed to be justified by research."*

This acceptance of the idea of total displacement has been highly damaging to crime prevention within the police service and, indeed, has even been described as *"paralyzing"* (Cornish and Clarke 1986). Is this easy acceptance of displacement sometimes a convenient excuse to justify inaction? Hill and Pease (2001) believe so. They comment, *"Sometimes the anticipation of displacement is transparently self-serving, with the failure to act being justified by reference to the certainty of displacement."* The author encountered this attitude, in 1996, at an early meeting with local authority technical officers, held to discuss a proposal that the authority adopt new security standards. One officer commented, *"What's the point? They'll get in anyway, and even if they don't, they'll just go somewhere else."* As Hill and Pease (2001) comment, *"As the clinician's tap evokes the knee jerk, so the crime prevention project evokes the claim from someone that 'prevented' crime has merely been displaced."*

The displacement theory is widely accepted because it is instinctively seen as 'common-sense,' which is reinforced by our understanding of the way the world works – or is thought to work. Criminals are, after all, criminals. Stop them in one location and surely they just find another. Common sense is a valuable commodity, but it has its limitations and changes with time. In 1492 it was 'common-sense' that the world was flat. Christopher Columbus, with a few others, knew this to be false, but arguing his case involved challenging people's perceptions of the world they lived in and the way it worked. (Common sense caused Columbus another problem when his own view of the world convinced him that he'd landed in China – which, to his bewilderment, proved to be the Bahamas.) As late as 1633, Galileo Galilei was brought before the Inquisition on a charge of heresy, which carried the death penalty, for very carefully questioning the God ordained, common sense view that the earth was the centre of the universe. He was convicted, sentenced and his book, the *Dialogue*, banned by the Roman Catholic Church until 1822. It is not known if Galileo, a devout Catholic, saw the irony in the fact that the common-sense view of the world was based on the understanding of two ancient classical scholars: Aristotle and Ptolemy – both pagans. Questioning the overwhelmingly held assumption of crime displacement does not quite result in a charge of heresy and a visit to the Inquisition, but it certainly places one in a very small minority. You may have all the evidence but don't expect much support.

The Great Divide

A second and related criticism of situational crime prevention measures is that they are said not to address the root causes of crime because they do not attempt to change individuals' willingness or desire to commit offences. Thus, those who seek to explain crime by understanding the motivations, background and social context of criminals see themselves as having a fundamentally deeper and more rounded understanding of the





problem than their rather utilitarian 'situational' counterparts. Those researching into displacement have detected this attitude. Hesseling (1994) commented "*displacement has far too often been a topic primarily discussed on the basis of assumptions or value judgments . . . [T]hese critics tend to base their conclusions on ideological grounds rather than on the basis of sound empirical knowledge*". Hill and Pease (2001) go further, describing the discussion as "*ill informed and misleading*". The two strategies of social and situational prevention have effectively been in competition with one another – sometimes for funding. Although this sterile conflict is largely a thing of the past, it still occasionally arises. The two strategies both have the same aim and should surely complement each other. Pease (1999) provides a succinct summary: "*It is probably not going too far to say that the best strategy for crime control is now clearly a combination of proven techniques for the reduction of individuals' tendency to commit crime through intervention in childhood, and the manipulation of environments to make that more difficult.*"

Strangely, displacement of crime is almost solely discussed in connection to prevention initiatives. And yet a sixth and much more plausible form of displacement – which is very rarely considered or discussed – is known as 'perpetrator displacement,' a term coined by Barr and Pease (1990). Ironically, whilst perpetrator displacement is the least discussed and most neglected form, it may be the most credible. Hill and Pease (2001) comment, "*The closest one can imagine to complete displacement would be in respect to what has come to be known as 'perpetrator displacement', whereby a crime opportunity is so compelling that the removal of any number of offenders will not prevent the crime. The obvious example concerns drug importation from a third world country, in which poverty generates an unlimited pool of volunteers to be 'mules'.*" Poverty is not the only generator of new perpetrators: vulnerability and a tempting target produce the same effect. Many police officers will have gone time and again to the same premises, which has been repeatedly burgled, often despite a number of arrests. The cause is often the inherent vulnerability of the premises, or the high desirability of the products found there. No one would argue that the arrests are a waste of time, but a Crime Prevention specialist might point out that only changing the inherent vulnerability of the premises is likely to genuinely alter the situation for the victim – and stem demand on the police.

The Suicide Analogy

Let us now move on to the research into crime displacement. Fortunately, there is a large body of research into the subject, which is partly because of its importance and partly because of the fierce debate that it has aroused. Oddly, at least initially, is the fact that "*the behaviour most intensively analyzed by criminologists in relation to the displacement hypothesis is not a crime: it is suicide*" (Barr and Pease 1992). What, one might well ask, does suicide have to do with it? Well, taking the decision to commit suicide is, without being flippant, a very final and major decision. If suicide could be reduced or prevented by the removal of a 'popular' method or opportunity (a situational measure), then surely the much less major decision to commit crime could be heavily influenced by opportunity reduction. Conversely, the displacement theory would plausibly suggest that a suicide prevented by the removal of one method would simply result in displacement to another method.

Research by Clarke and Mayhew (1988) is revealing and provides the basis for an interesting and useful analogy with crime. In 1958 the number of suicides committed using domestic gas was 2,637, which was very nearly half the total of all suicides. Gas at this time contained high levels of carbon monoxide, but this began to change in the 1960s, as gas began to be manufactured from oil instead of coal. In 1968, a second major change occurred when natural gas was discovered in the North Sea, which is entirely free of carbon monoxide and almost impossible to use for suicide. By the middle of the 1970s



atural gas had been introduced in most parts of the country. The rapid change to non-toxic gas allowed Clarke and Mayhew to assess the effect on suicide. The following table (abridged from Felson and Clarke 1998) illustrates the rapid decline in suicides using gas:

Suicides In England and Wales

Year	Total Suicides	Suicides by Domestic Gas	Percentage of Total
1958	5,298	2,637	49.8
1962	5,588	2,469	44.2
1966	4,994	1,593	31.9
1970	3,940	511	13.0
1974	3,899	50	1.3
1977	3,944	8	.2

Suicide by gas had been virtually eradicated in less than twenty years, and the overall number of deaths reduced by 25%. Clarke and Mayhew point out that this “deeply surprising” reduction took place during a period of economic uncertainty, when the rate might be expected to increase, which, indeed, was the trend in most European Countries.


Why didn't people simply choose another method? Well, domestic gas had a number of advantages as a form of suicide: it was readily available in every home, was painless, simple to use, didn't disfigure and was undoubtedly lethal. On the other hand, some of the alternatives are unattractive, unpleasant, messy and painful. Some require considerable courage, are less lethal (sleeping pills), and some are not normally readily available (firearms). Put quite simply, many people chose to live who would otherwise have chosen to end their lives. Changing opportunity, then, even where one might reasonably expect total displacement, had affected behaviour.

This, I believe, is a convincing analogy, but research on suicide is unlikely to change the opinion of Barr and Pease's (1990) “*extreme case pessimists*”. Only research directly related to crime could hope to achieve that, and we will now move into that arena.

Research on Crime Displacement

Research on crime displacement began to be carried out in a more systematic manner during the 1990s. There was a substantial step forward when research in Canada (Gabor 1990) and the United States (Eck 1993) specifically studied displacement and found it to be much less of a problem than had generally been supposed. Predictably, Eck suggested that where displacement did occur it was most likely to be to similar targets or to similar and adjacent areas.

The major breakthrough, however, came in 1994. The Ministry of Justice in Holland tasked Professor Rene B.P. Hesselting with finding and systematically analysing all the available literature on crime prevention measures in which researchers had specifically looked for evidence of displacement. This huge task took fourteen months and involved reviewing fifty-five published articles, including those of Gabor (1990) and Eck (1993). Twenty of the studies were British studies, sixteen were from the United States, ten were from Holland and the remaining nine came from five different countries, all from the developed world. Twenty-two of the studies found no displacement, and six of these found evidence that crime prevention measures had produced a beneficial effect in adjacent areas – known as diffusion of benefits. Thirty-three studies found some form of



placement, mostly quite limited, and no study found complete displacement of crime. The summary states *"displacement is a possible, but not inevitable consequence of crime prevention. Further, if displacement does occur, it will be limited in size and scope. This conclusion is supported by other review studies on the topic"*.

Although the findings were overwhelmingly positive, there was, not surprisingly, variation between different crimes. Drug dealing, for example, had been found to be susceptible to displacement (Rengert 1990, Sherman 1990, Caulkins 1992, Eck 1993), which echoed the views of Barr and Pease (1990) on perpetrator displacement. However, the commonly asserted belief that the behaviour of drug addicts is fixed and impervious to logic or a change in opportunity was not confirmed. Cromwell, Olson, Avary and Marks (1991) interviewed thirty active, drug-addicted burglars and concluded *"prevention does not always lead to displacement"*. In relation to addicts' behaviour they found that *"Heroin addicts appear to be more capable of controlling their habit than previously believed . . . The research revealed numerous instances where an addicted offender planned a burglary and was deterred temporarily . . . Occasionally the deterred burglar located another burglary target and committed a burglary, as intended. Just as often, however, the planned crime was not committed . . ."* The author spent three years in the Bradford Vice Squad and also found that most addicts assessed risk and consequences to a far greater extent than is generally supposed.


Residential Burglary

Hesseling's review of research was particularly positive in relation to residential burglary, with no evidence of displacement being discovered (Spickenheuer 1983, Forrester, Chatterton and Pease 1988, Schneider 1988, Lindsey and McGillis 1988, Pease 1991). This is important, not only because many crime prevention initiatives are targeted on burglary, but also because this crime is consistently found to be one of the public's main concerns (City of Bradford 1998). Residential burglary initiatives should therefore start confident in the knowledge that effective measures will produce net gains. The Royds regeneration scheme in Bradford is an example. The area comprises three council estates, which, in 1995, had an exceptionally severe rate of burglary, described as follows in a report (Town 1996):

The West Yorkshire Police area has the unenvied record for the worst rate of burglary dwelling in the country. One home in every fifteen is burgled annually (65 offences per 1000 households). The Royds area is situated in the Odsal division, which has by far the worst rate in West Yorkshire. One home in every seven is burgled annually (138 offences per 1000 households). And the worst area in the worst division in the worst force? You probably guessed it, the Royds! A separate rate has not yet been calculated, but is known to be far in excess of the appallingly high divisional average. It is estimated that at least one home in every six is burgled annually (165 per 1000 households).

As a comparison, the latest recorded crime figures (Home Office 2001) show the national average for burglary dwelling to be 20.9 per 1000 households.

Five years on, 1,338 houses have been refurbished to standards exceeding those required by the Police *Secured by Design* scheme. There is no record of any refurbished house ever being forcibly entered in over five years. ('Sneak in' burglaries and failed attempts, however, reduced the initially reported burglary reduction figure to 82%.) The Royds area is surrounded by privately owned housing and the immediate assumption was that burglary must have been displaced into these areas. At a meeting to evaluate the Royds scheme a senior police officer commented, *"Well done, I suppose it's all gone next door."* In fact, burglary in the adjoining areas had fallen. This attitude has understandably long frustrated those engaged in crime prevention. The Kirkholt burglary prevention project in



chdale suffered from a similar lack of understanding. Hill and Pease (2001) explain: *During the Kirkholt experiment in the mid-80s, a local paper splashed across its front page the claim by a local councillor that the project had merely moved the burglary problem down the road. All the evidence gainsaid this, but damage was done. Since then, the assertion of displacement dogs every second step the second author takes professionally. Displacement is claimed to have happened in every project undertaken, with the evidence for this crumbling whenever the assertion is challenged.*"


The Damage to Crime Prevention

How damaging is the lack of understanding on displacement? How much harder does it make obtaining funds to repeat such projects if those holding the purse strings assume they are merely moving the problem? Perhaps we can never truly know the answer, but the value of such projects is wider than perceived. In *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Giddens (1998) argues: *"A renewed emphasis upon crime prevention rather than law enforcement can go hand in hand with the reintegration of policing with the community . . . These approaches can in fact contribute directly and indirectly to furthering social justice. Where civil order has decayed along with public services and building stock, other opportunities decline also. Improving the quality of life in a neighbourhood can revive them."* As each burglary prevented saves the victim and society £2,300 (Brand and Price 2000), perhaps the case can be made for burglary reduction schemes even in purely monetary terms.

The Hesseling review was highly authoritative and convincing. Amongst criminologists it produced an unusual degree of consensus, which has, if anything, increased. Unfortunately, the reality is that the research has overwhelmingly not entered the public domain and, regrettably, barely entered the consciousness of the police service.

Beyond the Hesseling Review

Of course, discussion and research did not end in 1994, so what has been found since then? Much the same. Indeed, subsequent research findings are remarkably consistent with Hesseling. A Kansas City initiative to deal with gun related violence in identified 'hot spots' increased gun seizures by 65% and reduced gun related crime by 49%. A study by Sherman, Shaw and Rogan (1995) found no measurable displacement of gun crime to patrol beats surrounding the target area. Also in 1995, an evaluation of a car crime initiative (Hesseling and Aron) in the centre of Rotterdam, Holland, found no displacement of car crime to other areas, but did find evidence of a switch to other types of theft in the city centre. Green (1995) found that a multi-agency approach to dealing with drug and disorder problems in Oakland, California, produced a *"net diffusion of benefits in the areas surrounding targeted places"*. The repeat victimisation project in Huddersfield (Chenery, Holt and Pease 1997) looked for evidence of burglary displacement. Finding none, they commented, *"substantial displacement outside the division seems implausible in the extreme. It makes no sense"*. Credit card fraud was the subject of a study in Canada (Mativat and Tremblay 1997), which found that increased security measures did not result in displacement to other crimes. Felson and Clarke (1998) quote a similar experience: *"New identification procedures greatly reduced check frauds in Sweden, with no evidence of displacement to a range of 'conceivable' alternative crimes."* On the other hand, a case study in the financial centre of Copenhagen, Denmark (Carstensen and Frederiksen 1997), into the effects of camera surveillance, and other measures, on robbery concluded that whilst robbery had reduced for those able to afford the prevention measures, it had increased for those who could not. A review of the effect of situational crime prevention measures in Sweden by Knutsson (1998) produced very positive results across a range of



ences (burglary, oddly, was an exception). Where displacement was studied, the results were assessed as 'benign'.


In 1999 three evaluations were conducted to assess the impact of the police *Secured by Design* scheme on crime. The evaluations were carried out by the Building Research Establishment (Pascoe 1999), Jon Brown of Gwent Police in South Wales (Brown 1999) and by the Applied Criminology Group of the University of Huddersfield (Armitage 1999), later summarised and published as Home Office briefing note 7/00 (Armitage 2000). The results of all three studies were very positive and the issue of displacement was discussed to varying degrees. Although not specifically focused on displacement, the BRE report, commenting on a large burglary reduction in one scheme, states, "*it has not displaced the crime to the neighbours*". Brown's report found no evidence of displacement from prevented burglary into other crime. Assessing displacement was a specific research aim of Armitage's study. The conclusion (1999) states, "*As regards displacement, the evidence from the broad based analysis suggests that . . . there is a diffusion of benefits, as opposed to displacement of crime . . . This is particularly evident on some estates.*" At the time of writing (April 2001), Home Office commissioned research is being carried out into displacement by a consortium from Liverpool, Huddersfield and Hull universities. Twenty-one Burglary Reduction Programmes in the north of England are being evaluated. Early indications are that there has been *possible* displacement in six areas, but with *possible* diffusion of benefits in nine areas. In short, the findings are consistent with previous research into this subject.

Why Isn't Crime Displaced?

Displacement exists: thirty-three of the studies reviewed by Hesseling (1994) found some displacement, although overwhelmingly small in scale. Why, then, is the research so fundamentally and consistently positive? Why isn't crime displaced in the way or amount that common sense assumes will happen? For crime to be displaced it first has to be prevented, which is rather easy to overlook. The first task, then, is to show how crime is successfully reduced and then answer the question of why it is then not displaced. The author will argue that research into two vital areas provides the answers: firstly, 'opportunity theory', the crucial importance of which has long been underestimated, will show how crime is reduced. Secondly, consistent research findings into the distances overwhelmingly travelled by criminals to offend will explain why prevented crime is not displaced.

Clarke (1997) believes that criminologists have generally shown little interest in situational crime prevention. This neglect stems from what he regards as two mistakes of modern criminology. "*First, the problem of explaining crime has been confused with the problem of explaining the criminal*". The second related mistake is "*to confuse the problem of controlling crime with that of dealing with the criminal*". Moss and Pease (1999) make the same point: "*the problem of crime tends popularly to be reduced to the problem of what to do about the criminal*". Clarke argues that these assumptions are based directly on the mistaken belief that offenders faced with situational impediments will merely be displaced elsewhere.

As touched on earlier, situational crime prevention is said to neglect the root causes of crime because it doesn't attempt to change individuals' disposition to commit offences. This belief assumes that a variety of other factors are 'root causes' of crime: child-rearing, education, employment, social environment, psychological factors and even genetic makeup. These factors all have one thing in common to those involved in situational crime prevention – we can't do anything about them! Most people, including the author, would accept the vital importance of parenting, which will surely affect a child's attitude to





education, employment and society in general. But where does that take us in terms of crime prevention? Frankly, not very far. A frightened, elderly lady, who has been repeatedly burgled, is hardly likely to take comfort from efforts to improve the 'life chances' of local youths. She can't wait for the hoped for results, for society to improve or 'utopia' to arrive. Some have gone further and suggested that attempting to reform individuals is beyond the ability of any agency. R. Buckminster Fuller argues (see Poyner and Fawcett 1995), "*Don't attempt to reform man . . . My philosophy and strategy confine the design initiative to reforming only the environment in contradistinction to the almost universal attempts of humans to reform and restrain other humans by political actions, laws and codes.*" A bleak view, which surely goes too far; however, does it not contain a kernel of truth? Many of the quoted studies of situational crime prevention have produced positive results, whereas we tend to *hope* social crime prevention will.

Situational crime prevention can quickly and clearly deliver dramatic results. Clarke (1997) comments, "*What makes situational prevention interesting is that it so frequently works.*" Frequently is not always. Situational measures, like anything else, can be ill conceived and poorly implemented. However, well-designed measures can produce results far exceeding expectations. For example, the Royds regeneration scheme, discussed earlier, reduced house burglary from more than seven times the current national average to nearly zero on refurbished houses, providing a huge improvement in residents' quality of life. The scheme has, quite rightly, a full social dimension but it is the transformation in the design and physical security that produced such dramatic and relatively rapid results, not the instantaneous and wholesale reform of local burglars. In short, the scheme radically reduced the opportunity to burgle and the number of offences plummeted. The key, therefore, is reducing opportunity.

Opportunity Knocks

The importance of opportunity is brilliantly elucidated in *Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention* by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. Clarke (1998). (All subsequent references to Felson and Clarke refer to this work.) The authors convincingly argue that opportunity is a cause of crime and, indeed, a *root* cause of crime. "*critics,*" they argue, "*often downplay opportunities or temptations as true causes of crime. To show why this is mistaken we note that no crime can occur without the physical opportunities to carry it out. Whatever one's criminal inclinations . . . crime opportunities are necessary conditions for crime to occur, this makes them causes in a strong sense of the word.*" Of course this doesn't mean that the many other issues involved in why individuals have a particular propensity to commit crime are unimportant, merely that they are complex, controversial and not very helpful to today's practitioner. Felson and Clarke make the point: "*crime opportunities are at least as important as individual factors and are far more tangible and immediately relevant to everyday life.*"

The argument that reducing the opportunity for crime results in reductions in crime is simple enough, and one that those involved in *Designing out Crime* or other situational prevention have long predicated their work upon. Opportunity reduction takes many forms: examples include the design and layout of dwellings and commercial premises to reduce burglary and other crimes, design and management of shops to reduce shoplifting, targeted policing, identification requirements and cash handling procedures to reduce fraud, personal safety advice to reduce robbery, target hardening to make property more difficult to steal, property marking to deter theft and reduce profit, improving street lighting to facilitate natural surveillance and CCTV to deter and detect offences. The list could go on and on.





Felson and Clarke take the argument further by their assertion that opportunity plays a role in causing *all* crime, not merely property crime. They point out, for example, that homicide rates in the United States are many times higher than Britain and other European countries (although overall crime is lower) because of the widespread availability of handguns, which means that there is much greater opportunity to carry out a quick and deadly attack, often on the spur of the moment and perhaps for reasons that later seem trivial. If the killers were denied a handgun, would many plausibly kill with fists or knives? Zimring (1972) found that the likelihood of death in a violent encounter was directly related to the lethality of the instrument of violence used. Even mature and reasonable people sometimes lose their tempers and control. Put a gun in their hand during this brief period of rage and the result will often be tragic. Again, the people and the context does not change, merely the easy opportunity to squeeze a trigger. The logic is very close to that found earlier in relation to suicide (Clarke and Mayhew 1988).

Felson and Clarke observe the importance of opportunity in relation to sexual offences against children, domestic violence, drug dealing, prostitution and benefit fraud. They comment, "*There is no class of crime in which opportunity does not play a role.*" The authors conclude: "*Altering the volume of crime opportunities at any level will produce a change in criminal outcomes. Town planning, defensible space architecture, problem oriented policing, situational prevention – all of these offer methods for reducing crime opportunities . . . [A]ny success they might have serves as a demonstration of our basic theoretical point, that opportunity is a cause of crime.*"

Can opportunity explain the occasional differences in research findings on displacement? One example will suffice to briefly summarise the argument. In the 1970s, legislation required the installation of steering column locks in new cars. Research (Mayhew, Clarke, Sturman and Hough 1976) found that their introduction did seem to displace crime to older cars, which on the surface supports the displacement theory. However, what else could realistically be expected? A measure that only affected new cars, whilst millions of older cars remained unprotected, had not changed the opportunity to offend. The quantity of opportunity had not been 'squeezed' sufficiently to make a difference – at least in the short term. The author would argue that this is a consistent feature of the less positive displacement findings.

The Road to Nowhere

Opportunity theory, when explained, tends to make sense to people. However, whilst it explains how to reduce crime, it doesn't explain why prevented crime isn't simply displaced. Surely criminals simply move on to an area where opportunity remains unaltered. Well, the second crucial factor involved is the surprisingly short distances travelled by criminals to offend. Home Office Research Study 207, *The Road to Nowhere: The Evidence for Travelling Criminals* (2000) by Paul Wiles and Andrew Costello outlines the evidence on this subject. The assumption has been that as the mobility of the population has increased, so will travel to offend distances. In fact, Wiles and Costello, commenting on previous research into this subject, state, "*The most general and consistent [finding] is the fact that offenders do not appear to travel very far.*" Indeed, there is a remarkable degree of consistency in the findings "*from Rochdale to Riyadh,*" as Chenery, Holt and Pease (1997) comment. The Kirkholt project in Rochdale (Forrester, Chatterton and Pease 1988) found that "*The most striking point . . . was the extent to which burglary . . . was highly local.*" Al-Kahtani (1996) arrived at the same conclusion in a study of burglary in Saudia Arabia. Obviously some criminals do travel longer distances, but the point is that overwhelmingly crime is committed relatively close to home. Wiles and Costello found that the average distance travelled to commit domestic burglary was



... miles. Distances became even shorter in council estates, averaging less than a mile. Interestingly, the importance of opportunity is far from lost on Wiles and Costello: a main finding is *“Much travel associated with crime is not primarily driven by plans to offend but appears to be much more dependent upon opportunities presenting themselves during normal routines.”*

The following table (reproduced from Wiles and Costello) clearly demonstrates the importance of opportunities presenting themselves to offenders:

Target selection: Burglary

Reason for selection	(%)
Chance	63
Passing and looked easy (poor security)	31
Passing and looked easy (unoccupied)	26
Passing and looked easy (isolated/quiet)	26
Had noticed previously	20
Tipped off	17
Passing and looked wealthy	14
Revenge	6
Other	6
Burgled before	3


Note: percentages add up to over 100 because of multiple answers.

Wiles and Costello’s linkage of crime and relatively short patterns of routine movement strongly confirms earlier work by Beavon, Brantingham & Brantingham (1994), which also suggested that that the majority of property crime occurs within an offender’s routine activity and awareness space – the familiar and regularly used areas between home, shops, school and leisure areas.

If criminals overwhelmingly commit crime within relatively short distances of their home, then reducing the quantity of opportunity within that area should reduce crime, which is then very unlikely to be displaced outside of offenders’ normal travel distances. The combination, then, of opportunity theory and short travel to offend distances connect beautifully in explaining how crime is reduced but not displaced.

Conclusion


Concern about displacement is natural. However, when plausible but overwhelmingly unfounded belief affects policy and decision making, the results are harmful. The results of the Hesseling review (1994) are regularly repeated in Home Office research papers (Chenery, Holt and Pease 1997, Felson and Clarke 1998, Clarke 1999), but opinions are overwhelmingly still based on insidious, ideological beliefs (“There’s no point until we improve society.”) or simplistic assumptions. This is not to say that partial displacement does not exist or that some crimes are not more prone than others. However, the



Conclusion is clear: crime prevention initiatives can produce very substantial net gains, and commonly very little or no displacement is found. Reducing the local 'pot of opportunity' reduces crime.

References

- Al-Kahtani, Saeed. (1996) *Travel to Crime Distances of Burglars in Saudi Arabia* (Unpublished PhD: University of Manchester).
- Armitage, Rachel. (1999) *An Evaluation of Secured by Design Housing Schemes throughout the West Yorkshire Area* (The University of Huddersfield: The Applied Criminology Group).
- Armitage, Rachel. (2000) *An Evaluation of Secured by Design Housing Within West Yorkshire* (Home Office Briefing Note 7/00).
- Barr, Robert and Professor Ken Pease. (1990) *Crime Placement, Displacement, and Deflection*. In Michael Tonry and Norval Morris (Eds.) *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, vol. 12 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Barr, Robert and Professor Ken Pease. (1992) *A Place for Every Crime and Every Crime in its Place: An Alternative Perspective on Crime Displacement*. In *Crime, Policing and Place. Essays in Environmental Criminology* (London: Routledge).
- Beavon, Daniel J.K. Patricia L. Brantingham and Paul J. Brantingham. (1994) *The Influence of Street Networks on the Patterning of Property Offences*. In Ronald V. Clarke (Ed.) *Crime Prevention Studies*, Vol 2 (New York: Criminal Justice Press).
- Brand, Sam and Richard Price. (2000) *The Economic and Social Costs of Crime*. Home Office Research Study 217 (London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate).
- Brown, Jon. (1999) *An Evaluation of the Secured by Design Initiative in Gwent, South Wales* (Unpublished Dissertation: University of Leicester).
- Carstensen, Niels and Kim Birkholm Frederiksen (1997) *Situational Crime Prevention*. In Lene Ravn (Ed.) *Kriminalistisk Arbog* (Copenhagen: Criminal Procedure Institute).
- Caulkins, Jonathan P. (1992) *Thinking about Displacement in Drug Markets: Why Observing Change of Venue Isn't Enough*. In *Journal of Drug Issues*.
- Chenery, Sylvia, John Holt and Professor Ken Pease. (1997) *Biting Back II: Reducing Repeat Victimisation in Huddersfield*. Crime Detection and Prevention Paper 82 (London: Home Office).
- City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council. (1998) *Crime and Disorder Audit 1998* (Bradford: Strategic Management Unit).
- Clarke, Ronald V. (Ed.). (1997) *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies*. Second Edition (Albany, NY: Harrow & Heston).
- Clarke, Ronald V. (1999) *Hot Products: Understanding, Anticipating and Reducing Demand for Stolen Goods*. Police Research Series Paper 112 (London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate).
- Clarke, Ronald V. and Pat Mayhew (1988) *The British Gas Suicide Story and its Implications for Prevention*. In Michael Tonry and Norval Morris (Eds.), *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, Vol. 10 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Cornish, Derek B. and Ronald V. Clarke (1986) *The Reasoning Criminal* (New York: Springer-Verlag).
- Eck, John E. (1993) *The Threat of Crime Displacement*. In *Criminal Justice Abstracts*, 25: 527 – 546.
- Felson, Marcus and Ronald V. Clarke. (1998) *Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention*. Police Research Series Paper 98 (London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate).
- Forrester, David, Mike Chatterton and Professor Ken Pease. (1988) *The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project, Rochdale*. Crime Prevention Unit: Paper 13 (London: Home Office).
- Gabor, Thomas. (1990) *Crime Displacement and Situational Prevention: Towards the Development of some Principles*. In *Canadian Journal of Criminology* 32: 41 – 74.
- Giddens, A. (1998) *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (London: Polity).



Pease, Ken, Lorraine. (1995) Cleaning up Drug Hot Spots in Oakland, California: The Displacement and Diffusion Effects. In *Justice Quarterly* 12: 737 – 754.

Hesseling, Rene B.P. (1994) *Displacement: A Review of the Empirical Literature*. In *Crime Prevention Studies* 3 (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press).

Hesseling, Rene B.P. and Aron, U. (1995) *Car Burglaries: Reduction or Displacement? The Results of a Rotterdam Campaign to Curb Thefts from Cars* (The Hague: Neth).

Hill, Ivan and Professor Ken Pease. (2001) *The wicked Issues: Displacement and Sustainability* in Ballantyne S. et al. (Eds.) *Secure Foundations* (London: IPPR).

Home Office (2001) *Reported Crime* (London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate).

Knutsson, Johannes. (1998) *The Swedish Experience of Situational Crime Prevention*. In *Studies on Crime and Crime Prevention* 7: 189 – 212.

Lindsey, B. and D. McGillis (1988) *Citywide Community Crime Prevention: An Assessment of the Seattle Program*. In: D.P. Rosenbaum (Ed.) *Community Crime Prevention: Does it Work?* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage).

Mativat, Francois and Pierre Tremblay. (1997) *Counterfeiting Credit Cards: Displacement Effects, Suitable Offenders and Crime Wave Patterns*. In *British Journal of Criminology* 37: 165 – 183.

Meyhew, Patricia. Ronald V. Clarke, Andrew Sturman and J. Michael Hough. (1976) *Crime as Opportunity*. Home Office Research Study 34 (London: H.M. Stationary Office).

Moss, Dr Kate and Professor Ken Pease. (1999) *Crime and Disorder Act 1998: Section 17, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?* In *Crime Prevention and Community Safety: An International Journal*, 1, 4, 15 - 19 (Leicester: Perpetuity Press).

Painter, Kate and David P. Farrington. (1999) *Street Lighting and Crime: Diffusion of Benefits in the Stoke-on-Trent Project*. In Painter K. and Tilley N. (Eds.) *Surveillance of Public Space: CCTV, Street Lighting and Crime Prevention* (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press)

Pascoe, Dr Tim. (1999) *Evaluation of Secured by Design in Public Sector Housing* (Building Research Establishment).

Pease, Professor Ken. (1991) *The Kirkholt Project: Preventing Burglary on a British Housing Estate*. In the *Security Journal* 2: 73 – 77.


Pease, Professor Ken. (1999) *Lighting and Crime* (Rugby: The Institution of Lighting Engineers).

Poyner, Barry and Dr W.H. Fawcett. (1995) *Design for Inherent Security: Guidance for Non-Residential Buildings* (London: CIRIA).

Rengert, G.F. (1990) *Drug Purchasing as a Routine Activity of Drug Dependent Property Criminals and the Spatial Concentration of Crime* (Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology annual conference).

Schneider, A.L. (1988) *Neighborhood-Based Antiburglary Strategies: An Analysis of Public and Private Benefits from the Portland Program*. In: D.P. Rosenbaum (Ed.) *Community Crime Prevention: Does it Work?* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage).

Sherman, Lawrence W. (1990) *Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence*. In Michael Tonry and Norval Morris (Eds.) *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, Vol. 12 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).



erman, Lawrence W. James W. Shaw and Dennis P. Rogan (1995) *The Kansas City Gun Experiment*. Research in Brief Series (Washington DC: U.S. National Institute of Justice).

Spickenheuer, J.L.P. (1983) Untranslated. *Voetsurveillance en Preventievoorlichting in AmsterdamOsdorp; een Onderzoek naar de Effecten op de Criminaliteitsontwikkeling*. 's-Gravenhage, NETH: Staatsuitgeverij.

Tilley, Nick. Professor Ken Pease, Mike Hough and Rick Brown. (1999) *Burglary Prevention: Early lessons from the Crime Reduction Programme*. PRCU Research Paper 1 (London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate).

Town, Stephen. (1996) *Burglary Dwelling: The Opportunity for Reduction Through Estates Regeneration* (unpublished paper for West Yorkshire Police).

Wiles, Paul and Andrew Costello. (2000) *The 'Road to Nowhere': The Evidence for Travelling Criminals*. Home Office Research Study 207 (London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate).

Zimring, Franklin E. (1972) *The Medium is the Message: Firearm Calibre as a Determinant of Death from Assault*. In *Journal of Legal Studies* 1: 97 – 123.

Revised 5 October 2001